Abstract-Wireless communication is particularly vulnerable to signal jamming attacks. Spread spectrum mitigates such problem by spreading normal narrowband signals over a much wider band of frequencies and forcing jammers who do not know such spread pattern to invest much more effort to launch attacks. However, in broadcast systems, jammers can easily find out the spread pattern by compromising some receivers. Several groupbased approaches have been proposed to deal with insider jammers who can compromise receivers in broadcast systems; they can tolerate t malicious receivers as long as the system can afford 2t additional copies for each broadcast message. This paper introduces a novel jamming-resistant broadcast system that organizes receivers into multiple channel-sharing broadcast groups and isolates malicious receivers using adaptive re-grouping. By letting receivers in different groups partially share their channels, this scheme reduces the extra communication cost from 2t to (2 − ρ)t copies, where ρ is the channel sharing factor (0<ρ<1); this is much closer to optimal given the previously proven lower bound of t additional copies. In addition, a sequential test based scheme is also proposed to further improve the performance so that ρ can be set larger to save more communication cost without reducing security. The analytic and simulation results show that the proposed approaches greatly push limit of jamming-resistant broadcast towards optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
In conventional wireless communication, the information bearing baseband signal is modulated onto a proper highfrequency carrier for transmission. The modulated signal occupies a region of radio spectrum centered at the carrier frequency. If the attacker (or jammer) injects sufficient interfering signals into the same spectral region, he can significantly reduce the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver and thus interrupt the wireless communication [13] .
Spread spectrum has long been an effective technique to mitigate jamming attacks. Examples include Frequency Hopping (FH) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) [13] . Their idea is to spread the signal over a much larger bandwidth to make it extremely expensive for an adversary to block the communication. In general, the more bandwidth, the better the resistance against jamming attacks. Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) and Software Defined Radio were proposed for efficient spectrum management in cognitive radio networks [1] . Researchers have studied the combination of spread spectrum and OFDM to improve not only the efficiency and flexibility in spectrum usage [6] but also the resistance against the jamming attacks [2] , [9] , [20] , [21] .
These jamming-resistant techniques can be modeled as a virtual multi-channel communication system, where the virtual (or logical) channel denotes the signal coordinates determined by either the spreading code (DSSS), the frequency-hopping pattern (FH), the sub-carriers (OFDM), or their combinations. In such system, the available spectrum contains a large number of orthogonal channels. Only a small subset of them will be used for communication. If the jammer does not know which subset is in use, he will be forced to either jam a large number of channels with negligible interference in each or only a few of them and leave many others, very likely including those actually used for transmission, interference free [13] , [15] . Forward error correction (FEC) schemes are also adopted to reduce the interference from jamming attacks and random noises [7] , [12] , [14] . They enhance the robustness of communication through redundancy.
These mechanisms work well for one-to-one communication. However, in broadcast communication, there are many receivers. Once the attacker compromises a receiver and finds out which channels are in use, he can directly block those channels without wasting any effort. The sender can certainly use jamming-resistant one-to-one communication to send a separate copy of each message to each receiver to combat the jamming. However, this introduces significant cost and delay, especially when a huge amount of data (e.g., multimedia data) needs to be disseminated or the data is time-sensitive (e.g., in battlefields or other emergency situations).
Group-based schemes have been proposed to combat insider jammers in broadcast systems [3] - [5] . The idea is to organize receivers into multiple broadcast groups and use different channels for different groups. This ensures that a compromised receiver can only affect the members in the same group. A "divide and conquer" strategy is then used to isolate malicious receivers. However, these schemes require the sender to send a separate copy of each broadcast message to every group, causing a lot of communication overhead. The sender needs to send at least 2t extra copies of messages for each broadcast to deal with t compromised receivers.
We propose a partial channel sharing solution to reduce such extra communication overhead. Instead of sending messages using one channel [3] - [5] , we divide such channel into multiple smaller ones and let different groups partially share their channels. In this way, the data sent over the shared channels can reach more than one groups, saving substantial communication cost. However, the challenge is that a malicious receiver in one group may try to jam those shared channels to affect the message reception in other groups. In this paper, we develop an efficient solution to reduce the communication overhead without scarifying the resilience against malicious receivers.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we propose a novel jamming-resistant broadcast system, which organizes receivers into multiple channel-sharing broadcast groups and isolates malicious receivers using adaptive regrouping. Compared to existing approaches, this scheme reduces the communication cost from 2t to (2 − ρ)t additional messages, where t is the number of compromised receivers and ρ is the channel sharing factor (0<ρ<1). As a result, the proposed scheme is much closer to optimal considering the previously proven lower bound of t additional messages (in [3] ) under realistic scenarios. Second, a sequential test based scheme is also proposed to further improve the performance of our jamming-resistant broadcast system so that the sharing factor ρ can be set larger to save more communication cost without reducing security. In addition, The analytic and simulation results show that the proposed approaches greatly push the performance limit of jamming-resistant broadcast systems towards optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the network and attack models. Section III presents our first jamming-resistant broadcast protocol. Section IV evaluates the performance of our first protocol. Section V discusses an improved approach using Lai's Bayes sequential tests. Section VI reviews related work on jamming-resistant communication. Section VII concludes this paper and points out some future directions. Table I lists some frequently used notations. In this paper, we consider that a benign sender needs to broadcast messages to a set of r receivers, {R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R r }. We assume that the system contains totally n orthogonal virtual channels, which are determined by spreading code, frequency-hopping pattern, sub-carriers, or their combinations. The proposed techniques in this paper can be considered as group-based approaches. In a group-based approach, we organize the receivers into multiple groups and assigns m (m n) channels to each group for broadcast communication. The receivers in the same group listen to and receive messages from the m channels assigned to the group. We assume that the sender and the receivers are well time synchronized and every receiver knows when to start and stop the transmission at any given channel.
II. NETWORK AND ADVERSARY MODEL
Let C G be the set of active channels assigned to group G (|C G | = m). Every broadcast message M will be processed according to certain forward error correction (FEC) codes at packet-level [7] , [12] , [14] and divided into m packets such that M can be recovered from any set of (1 − η) × m + 1 correct packets. These m packets will be transmitted on the active channels of every group, one for each channel. Thus, a set of broadcast channels assigned to group G C G set of jammed channels in C G t number of the compromised receivers, i.e., t = |R | m number of broadcast channels assigned to each receiver n total number of available channels in the system j number of channels can be jammed at one time η fraction of corrupted channels we can tolerate ρ channel sharing factor, i.e., fraction of shared channels receiver in group G can always recover the original message M unless η × m or more channels in C G are jammed. We assume that each receiver shares a secret key with the sender; this key is used to select the secret channels for the jamming-resistant one-to-one communication with the sender. Hence, this private and jamming-resistant channel allows a receiver to send feedback to the sender for making more informed decisions. In addition, we also assume that the sender can detect packet loss at every active channel. This can be achieved by (1) having the sender monitor the active channels, (2) adding extra monitoring nodes in the network, or (3) asking those existing receivers to report the channel condition.
The attacker's goal is to prevent as many receivers from receiving broadcast messages as possible. We assume that the attacker knows all technique specifics, including configuration parameters. We consider both outsider attackers and insider attackers. An outsider attacker does not know which channels are used. Thus he only randomly selects channels to jam. We assume that outsider attackers have power constraints that only allow them to block no more than j channels at one time.
An insider attacker can compromise some receivers and learn all their secrets, including their assigned channels. In this paper, we focus on detecting the active malicious node, called traitor, whose channel information is currently being used by the attacker to launch jamming attacks. For those stealthy or selective attackers that behave normally most of the time, our goal is to catch them after they jam the communication for more than a small number of times. We let t denote the total number of compromised receivers.
III. SCHEME I: ADAPTIVE RE-GROUPING WITH PARTIAL CHANNEL SHARING For each broadcast message, the goals of jamming-resistant broadcast are: (i) the sender sends as few copies of this message as possible and (ii) the message can be correctly delivered to as many receivers as possible in the presence of insider jammers. The former indicates the need for a small number of groups. However, the latter requires small group size since a traitor can block the messages to all other receivers in the same group. This usually leads to a large number of groups. In Scheme I, we address such dilemma by proposing an adaptive re-grouping idea to isolate traitors without increasing the number of groups and a partial channel sharing idea to reduce the number of active channels needed to deliver broadcast messages. Observation
Specifically, we classify the groups into trusted groups (T G) and suspicious groups (SG). There is only one trusted group but could be multiple suspicious groups. The idea is to adaptively re-group the receivers if the attacker launches the jamming attack so that the benign nodes are more likely to be merged into the trusted group, and the traitors are more likely to be included in a number of small suspicious groups.
The high-level description of our protocol is given below. The trusted group includes all receivers currently believed (by our protocol) to be trustworthy. It is possible that the trusted group becomes untrusted later when more observations about the channel condition are available. Once this happens, we split the group into two suspicious groups (or a suspicious group pair) and set the trusted group to be empty. We let this pair of suspicious groups partially share their channels for less communication cost, instead of using completely different set of channels. A group is said to be a suspicious group if we currently cannot determine whether it contains traitors; we need more observations about the channel condition to make the decision. Once we determine one of the group pair contains traitors, we split it into two smaller suspicious groups for further processing. Meanwhile, if we can not determine the other group contains traitors at that time, we will believe it to be trustworthy and merge it into the trusted group. In other words, a suspicious group is merged into the trusted group only when its peer is determined to be untrustworthy. The above procedure continues until all traitors are isolated or the jamming attack stops.
Given the high-level protocol description, the remaining issues are: (1) how to detect the existence of traitors in the trusted group, (2) how to partially share channels between a suspicious group pair, (3) how to detect the untrustworthy group in a suspicious group pair, and (4) how to identify and remove traitors. We answer these problems in the following.
Detecting the existence of traitors in the trust group: Initially, all receivers belongs to the same trusted group T G; they share the same m channels. Note that if the trusted group contains no traitors, it is very difficult for the attacker to jam enough (at least ηm) channels to block the communication, as we will show in Section IV. Thus, if the number of jammed channels exceeds ηm, i.e., the receivers cannot recover the broadcast message, then it is very likely that the trusted group has traitors at this moment. Hence, we simply monitor whether |C T G |, i.e., the number of jammed channels in T G, exceeds ηm. If not, the group is still a trusted group; otherwise, we consider it as untrusted and immediately split it into two suspicious groups. (The trusted group becomes empty in this case.) Table II lists the criteria for making decisions.
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a group is determined to be untrusted, we randomly split it into two equal-sized suspicious groups, i.e., a suspicious group pair. We focus on a given suspicious group pair SGP during the discussion. We let SG 1 and SG 2 denote the two groups of SGP . We assign m randomly selected channels to each of these two groups. Let C SG1 and C SG2 be the channels assigned, respectively, to SG 1 and SG 2 . In this paper, SG 1 and SG 2 share a random fraction ρ of channels. Let SC be the shared common channels and EC 1 and EC 2 be the private (exclusive) channels for groups SG 1 and SG 2 , respectively. In each round of re-grouping, a receiver only receive its channel set. The sender will never leak any information about which channels belong to SC, EC 1 , or EC 2 . Apparently, if both groups in SGP have traitors, the attacker can find out the channel assignment and figure out all channel sharing information; this impact will be evaluated in Section IV.
Determining the untrusted group in SGP: The goal here is to determine which group (SG 1 , SG 2 , or both) contains traitors. Let us consider an example when the sender notices that |C SG1 | ≥ ηm. There are three cases. First, when only SG 1 contains traitors, the attacker can easily select and jam ηm or more channels in C SG1 . Second, when only SG 2 contains traitors, the attacker can jam some channels
Procedure 2 ImmediateDetection
else // E 5 = T 8:
end if 10: end if in C SG2 expecting to jam some channels in SC and then randomly jam the channels in all other available channels expecting to jam the channels in EC 1 . It is possible that |C SG1 | = |SC | + |EC 1 | ≥ ηm. Third, both SG 1 and SG 2 contains traitors. In this case, the attacker knows the channel assignment and can arbitrarily jam the channels in C SG1 . An effective scheme is thus needed to distinguish these three cases given the observations about the channel condition.
Our scheme takes advantage of the fact that the channel assignment of a traitor-free group is always kept secret. In other words, the sender only sends C SG1 to the receivers in SG 1 , but does not leak anything about which channels belong to EC 1 or SC. Hence, we have the following observation: if only one suspicious group in SGP has traitors, the probability that its private channels are jammed is usually higher than the probability that the private channels of the peer (traitor-free) group in SGP are jammed. The reason is that the adversary does not know which channels are private to the peer group and can only randomly select channels from all available channels to jam. Therefore, we can determine which group has traitors by studying the jammed channels.
More specifically, if any receiver in the suspicious group pair SGP is blocked from receiving broadcast messages, we mark the group which has more jammed private channels as the one that contains traitors. Note that it is possible that both SG 1 and SG 2 contain traitors. In this case, the attacker can identify EC 1 , EC 2 and SC. Thus, he can jam exactly the same number of channels in both EC 1 and EC 2 . This is, however, unlikely to happen in the case where at most one group contains the traitor. Therefore, if |EC 1 | = |EC 2 |, we mark both SG 1 and SG 2 as untrusted. Table III lists the decision criteria on determining untrusted groups. Detailed analysis will be given in Section IV.
Detecting and revoking the traitor: If a traitor keeps attacking the broadcast system, the size of its group will be reduced continuously. Once we detect a group with only one member has the traitor, we can directly revoke this member from the system. Procedure 1 shows the pseudocode of our jamming-resistant broadcast scheme. Figure 1 shows an example of our jamming-resistant broadcast scheme.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SCHEME I
There are two traitor detection modules in Scheme I, one for detecting the existence of traitors in T G and the other for detecting which group in SGP cannot be untrusted. A traitor detection is used to decide one of the hypotheses in Tables II  and III based on the channel condition. In our analysis, we will focus on the decision error rate Pr[Accept H|H = F ], where F represents FALSE. We will also discuss the impact of system parameters (m, N , η, and ρ) and the attacker related parameter (j) on our protocol. We assume ρ > η.
A. Performance of Traitor Detection for the Trusted Group
Pr[Accept H 0 |H 0 =F ]: If |C T G | < η m , the nodes in T G can recover the broadcast message, the attacker does not block the communication. Although some receivers may have been compromised, there are no traitors actively involved in jamming the communication. It is therefore reasonable to believe that Pr[Accept H 0 |H 0 = F ] = 0. Nevertheless, we can always determine the existence of malicious receivers once the attacker starts the jamming attacks.
Pr[Accept H 1 |H 1 =F ]: If T G contains no traitors, the attacker does not know which m channels belong to C T G , he can only randomly select j channels from all n channels to jam. Thus, |C T G |, the number of T G's jammed channels, follows the hypergeometric distribution f (i; n, m, j): Figure 2 shows the decision error rate for traitor detection on a traitor-free T G under different settings. Parameter n is determined by factors like the design of spreading code, the channel hopping patterns, and the available spectrum in a specific channelization scheme. Intuitively, a larger n means more resistance against jamming attacks. This is shown in Figure 2(a) . In multi-carrier systems, m is often used for resource allocation. If a node requires more bandwidth, we can assign more channels. On the other hand, we can increase m to improve the resistance against the jamming attacks as shown in Figure 2 (a). η is determined by the forward error correction (FEC) scheme. Figure 2(b) shows that we can enhance the resistance against jamming by increasing η. Based on Figure 2 , we choose n/m = 10 3 , j/m = 1 ∼ 100, and η = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 in all our later analysis.
B. Performance of Detecting the Untrusted Group in SGP
Pr[Accept H x |H x =F ]| x=3,4, or 5. : Since our scheme has the same performance when x = 3 or x = 5, we only discuss the cases when x = 3 or x = 4. According to the definitions of the hypotheses in Table III , we have
For simplicity, we define the following four probabilities:
where T represents TRUE. Thus, we have
P 1 is the probability that event E 3 occurs, given the condition that only SG 1 contains traitors. In this case, the attacker only knows C SG1 and cannot distinguish EC 1 from SC. To interrupt the communication at SG 2 , the attacker may first jam a number of channels in C SG1 expecting to hit some channels in SC, and then jams (j −|C SG1 |) channels randomly selected from the other available (n − |C SG1 |) channels expecting to hit some channels in EC 2 . Event E 3 describes the case where (i) at least one of |C SG1 | and |C SG2 | exceed η × m and (ii) |EC 1 | < |EC 2 |. These limit the ranges of |C SG1 |, |EC 1 |, and |EC 2 |. Apparently, we have |C SG1 | = m since otherwise
Consequently, we also have
If |C SG1 | < η m , the attacker has to make |EC 2 | greater than ηm − |SC 1 | to ensure that |C SG2 | ≥ ηm in order to interrupt the communication at SG 2 . Since |SC 1 | = |C SG1 |− |EC 1 |, we have
if |C SG1 | < η m,
Obviously, the upper bound of |EC 2 | is given by:
Therefore, P 1 can be estimated by:
where
). The ranges of |C SG1 |, |EC 1 |, and |EC 2 | are given by Inequalities 3,4, and 5, respectively. Similarly, we can calculate P 2 , P 3 , and P 4 . The results are summarized in Table IV .
C. Performance under Worst-Case Scenarios
In this subsection, we will analyze the worst-case performance of our protocol when the attacker takes the best possible strategy (i.e., he launches various types of jamming attacks to introduce the maximum number of wrong decisions). The analysis is conducted in the following there cases: (1) no group contains traitors; (2) only one suspicious group contains traitors; (3) both of the suspicious group pair contain traitors. We skip the case where the trusted group contains traitors, because once the attacker blocks the communication, we will notice the existence of traitors.
No group in SGP contains traitors: In this case, the attacker is not aware of any channel assignment, and can only jam randomly selected channels. The best strategy is to jam as many channels as he could. Apparently, the energy limit determines the attacker's jamming ability, i.e., the more channels he can block at the same time (or the greater the value of j), the higher probability he can interrupt the communication. This is shown in Figures 2 and 3 .
Only one group in SGP contains traitors: Suppose only SG 1 has traitors and the attacker intends to fool us into believing that SG 2 contains traitors. Let us consider P 1 and P 3 . In addition to j, there is another parameter that can affect the attacker's jamming performance, i.e., |C SG1 |. Different from j, which is limited by the attacker's energy, |C SG1 | can be controlled by the attacker. Figure 4 shows the impact of |C SG1 |. From Figure 4 (a), we know that P 1 reaches its maximum value P max,1 when |C SG1 | = ηm − 1. This means that the best jamming strategy 
See Inequality 5 and 6. is to jam ηm−1 channels in C SG1 and spend the rest of energy on jamming the channels randomly selected from C c SG1 . Similarly, from Figure 4 (b), P 3 ≤ P max,3 = P 3 | |C SG 1 |=ηm . Intuitively, the insider jammer has more impact than the outsider attacker. Given the same configuration, we have P max,1 > P 2 and P max,3 > P 4 , which can be seen from comparing Figure 5 . From Figures 2, 3 , and 5, we can see that the performance degrades with a larger j, but can be improved dramatically by increasing η.
Both groups of SGP contain traitors: In this case, the attacker knows the channel assignment and sharing information. However, this does not mean that the attacker can evade our protocol and block the broadcast messages arbitrarily. To prevent a victim R i from receiving the broadcast message, the attacker has to jam at least ηm channels assigned to R i , which means one of the events E 3 , E 4 , or E 5 must occur.
Correspondingly, we will accept either H 3 , H 4 , or H 5 , and split the groups to isolate traitors. Thus, the attacker's best strategy here is to "sacrifice" the traitors in one group to hide the traitors in the other group. Note that the hidden traitors will be assigned into the trusted group, and have the chance to launch another attack. However, we note that the hidden traitor can simply be handled at the moment when its knowledge is reused for launching the jamming attacks in the future.
Overall impact of compromised receivers: In the following, we analyze how well this protocol performs under various types of jamming attacks including the selective attacks, where the insider jammers do not launch attacks continuously but choose to only attack at selected times. We consider the following questions: given t compromised receivers, how many benign receivers will lose the broadcast message in each round of jamming attacks, and how many rounds of jamming attacks can the attacker launch?
From Figure 1 , we notice that the adaptive re-grouping leads to a tree-like structure. Each group that is believed to contain traitors is split into two suspicious groups, which can be considered as its children. If a traitor R i keeps active, i.e., jamming, its group will be split continuously until R i becomes the leaf of the tree, i.e., it becomes the only member of its group. In this case, if R i keeps acting maliciously, it will be removed from the system. Thus the attacker will keep R i inactive at certain point so that the sender has to keep sending messages to its group, wasting the sender's energy.
When we split an untrusted group into two suspicious groups, it is possible that both contain traitors but later we only detect one of them being untrustworthy. In other words, the attacker can hide the traitors in one of the groups by simply not using their secrets to jam the communication, and thus this group will be merged into the trusted group. The attacker may take advantage of this and make use of the secrets of its traitor one by one to maximize the interference.
Let R x denote the x-th active traitor whose secret is used to launch jamming attacks. In the beginning, the attacker keeps using R 1 's secret for jamming until R 1 becomes a leaf, producing two suspicious groups and one trusted group. This introduces lg(|R|) rounds of attack. After that, the attacker will make use of the secret at another traitor R 2 for jamming until R 2 becomes a leaf, producing 4 suspicious groups and one trusted group. This introduces lg(|R| − 2) rounds of (a) MAX(P 1 , P 2 ).
(b) MAX(P 3 , P 4 ). Fig. 5 . The decision error rate in traitor detection on SGP when only one group contains traitors (m = 50, n/m = 10 3 , and ρ = 0.5).
attacks. This procedure continues until all traitors become leaves, producing 2t suspicious groups and one trusted group. Hence, R x can be used for lg(|R| − 2(x − 1)) times.
Note that the number of receivers affected by the active traitor R x varies in each round of attack. This is because the size of R x 's group is reduced by half after each round of attack. Therefore, the maximum numbers of receivers affected by R x in each round of attack are {|R| − 2(x − 1) − 1,
Overall, the maximum rounds of jamming attacks can be estimated by t x=1 lg(|R| − 2(x − 1)) . Communication overhead and impact of ρ: Obviously, it is not possible to merge all the trusted receivers into a single group unless all the traitor nodes can be exactly pinpointed. However, if a malicious receiver becomes the single member in its own group, it may choose to hide himself and never attack again. There is no effective mechanism to detect such non-active attacker, and the sender has to send extra copies to guarantee that no legitimate receiver will lose the message. The existing solutions require 2t extra copies [3] . According to the previous analysis, our approach reduces such extra overhead to (2 − ρ)t copies. If ρ = 0.5, the communication overhead is 1.5t extra messages. Apparently, a larger ρ means fewer copies we need to send for each broadcast and thus less communication overhead. By properly configuring ρ, we can have much less communication cost than the previous methods.
However, we note that the value of ρ impacts P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , and P 4 . Thus, it will also impacts the decision error rate. Figure 6 plots the maximal decision error rates on testing hypotheses H 3 and H 4 with different parameters.
We first look at Pr max [Accept H 4 |H 4 =F ]. Based on the previous analysis, we know that
which apparently increases with ρ. Figure 6 (b) also confirms that the decision error rate on H 4 increases with ρ.
We then look at Pr max [Accept H 3 |H 3 =F ]. Suppose only group SG 1 has traitors, the attacker's best strategy is to jam ηm − 1 channels in C SG1 and as many channels in C SG1 c as possible. If the attacker hits no channel in EC 1 and one channel in EC 2 , he can fool us into believing that SG 1 is traitor-free but SG 2 is not. The probability of this happening can be estimated by
(a) Impact of ρ on testing H 3 .
(b) Impact of ρ on testing H 4 . Fig. 6 . The impact of ρ in resource-constraint systems (n/m = 10 3 , and j/m = 50).
We note that this is not a monotonic function. The reason is that
increases with ρ, but
decreases with ρ. In addition, we also need to consider other parameters such as m, n, j, and η. Moreover, since Pr[EC 2 ≥ 1] is usually small, the decision error rate on testing H 3 is still relatively low even when the decision error rate on testing H 4 with the same parameter set is very high, which can be seen from Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (b).
From the above discussion, we believe that given a reasonable system configuration and attacker's jamming ability, our system can resist jamming attacks with very low decision error rates. However, we also note that if we have very limited resources (i.e., very small m, n and η) and strong attackers (i.e., a very large j), our system will generate a high decision error rate in order to save more cost in terms of communication. This is shown in Fig. 6 . In the next section, we will present a scheme to cope with the resource limitation and powerful attackers and also to improve the performance so that we can set a larger ρ to save more communication cost.
V. SCHEME II: SEQUENTIAL TEST BASED DETECTION
To reduce the decision error rate, we propose to get more observations about the channel condition before making any decision. Generally, the more observations, the lower the decision error rate (and the larger ρ we can set). However, waiting for more observations increases the cost and the decision delay. For example, the sender will need to assign new channels to replace those jammed ones.
We propose to use a risk function to capture the impact of detection errors and delays. Without loss of generality, we consider a loss of 1 if the decision is wrong, and a loss of 0 if the decision is correct. We then introduce c to represent the ratio of the cost of waiting for one more observation over the cost of making a wrong decision. Thus, the problem becomes to find a solution to minimize the following risk function:
where variable S denotes the total number of channel observations we have collected at the moment when we stop the sequential test and make a decision.
Procedure 3 SequentialDetection
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A. Problem Statement
As discussed before, when we detect jamming attacks in SGP (i.e., MAX(|C SG1 |, |C SG2 |) ≥ ηm), we know that at least one of them contains traitors. Note that if both groups contain traitors, we can always identify at least one untrusted group. The missed one that also contains traitors can be simply handled in the future. As a result, in this section, we focus only on the case when only one of these two groups contain traitors.
The main problem now is to tell which group is more likely to contain traitors given the observations about the channel condition. In the following, we will convert such traitor detection problem into an estimation problem of two random variables X and Y that are given by
Since only one group contains traitors, we can see that X and Y will both follow a Bernoulli distribution with a mean of P x and P y , respectively. Specifically, we have
We also have P th = Pr max [X = 1|SG 2 has no traitors]. In other words, if SG 2 has no traitors, we have P x ≤ P th . This implies:
Similarly, we have
P y > P th ⇒ H 4 : SG 1 has traitors. (10) From 8, 9, 10, and 11, we know that we can use P x and P y for detecting the group that contains traitors. We can then apply Lai's Bayes Sequential Test [8] to address the problem.
B. Applying Lai's Bayes Sequential Test
We do not use those popular sequential test methods such as the fictitious optimal fixed sample size test or Wald's sequential probability ratio test since they require the knowledge of fixed P x and P y to achieve the optimal results. In our case, the attacker can arbitrarily change these values.
In [8] , Lai gives a Bayes sequential test scheme to test the composite hypothesis: H : P < P 0 versus K : P > P 0 . Lai shows that the risk z (i.e., Equation 7) of this sequential test is asymptotically equivalent to that of the fictitious optimal fixed sample size test that assumes the knowledge of P . The stopping rule of Lai's Bayes sequential test is
where inf{s} denotes the infimum of set {s}; I( P , P ) is the Kullback-Leibler information number given by I( p, p) = p log( p/p) + (1 − p) log((1 − p)/(1 − p)). When p = 0 or 1, we define I( p, p) = log 2; h 0 (·) is a function given in [8] , which is also listed below:
The terminal decision rule (the final decision) is to accept H or K according to P S > P 0 or P S < P 0 .
C. The Bayes Sequential Test Based Detection
Based on Lai's stopping rule and terminal decision rule, we propose our Bayes sequential test based detection in Procedure 3, which can be used to replace Line 15 in Procedure 1 to have an improved scheme based on Bayes sequential tests.
D. Performance Analysis
Procedure 3 requires two system parameters, c and P th . c is introduced to balance the detection error and delay; P th is the function of the system parameters (m, n, ρ, and η) and the attacker's jamming ability (j), as discussed in Section IV-C. Figure 6 (a) shows that P th < 0.5 is usually true. Since the (a) Wrong decision rate.
(b) Decision making speed. Fig. 8 . Performance of sequential test based detection in the worst-case scenario. (P th is the probability of making a wrong decision of accepting H 3 using our first scheme in the worst-case scenario.) cost of making a wrong decision is very high, c is usually very small. We thus set c = 10 −4 as in [8] . We then use simulation to evaluate the performance under different values of P x or P y , which can be controlled by the attacker. The results in Figure 7 are based on 50,000 rounds of simulation. It shows that our Bayes sequential test based approach can achieve a low risk no matter what strategy the attacker takes. Figure 7 also shows that the best strategy for the attacker is to let P x = P th or P y = P th . Figure 8 plots both of the expected number of lost messages before making a decision and the decision error rate. It shows that our scheme can achieve very good performance even in the worst case scenario where the attacker always takes the best strategy. It also shows that we can configure c according to the application to balance the decision delay and the error rate. Figure 8 (a) also plots P th , the probability of making a wrong decision of accepting H 3 using our first scheme when the attacker takes the best jamming strategy. We can see that our Bayes sequential test based detection dramatically reduces the decision error rate with very small number of samples (less than 10 in most cases). Unlike the first scheme, the second scheme can achieve small decision error rates even if ρ is set large (e.g., 0.9). As a result, our sequential test based detection scheme can further reduce the communication overhead by configuring a larger ρ.
VI. RELATED WORK Jamming-resistant communication has long been an active research area [10] , [11] , [13] , [19] . To provide jammingresistant broadcast, several group-based schemes were studied [3] - [5] . In [4] , each receiver is assigned to several groups and receives broadcast messages sent to these groups. This scheme requires knowledge of the number of compromised receivers before the group assignment. Two dynamic grouping schemes have been recently proposed [3] , [5] ; they change the group membership dynamically using a "divide and conquer" strategy to counter jamming attacks. However, given t compromised receivers, these two schemes require the sender to send 2t additional copies for each broadcast message to cope with t compromised receivers. Our scheme reduces such additional overhead to (2 − ρ)t copies, saving a fraction of ρ/2 communication cost. For example, when ρ = 0.8, we can save 40% communication cost.
In addition to jamming-resistant broadcast, researchers have studied jamming-resistant schemes to setup a secret key between two nodes [16] - [18] . These schemes involve a lot of communication overhead and a long delay; they complement our scheme in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose an adaptive jamming-resistant broadcast system with partial channel sharing. Compared to existing approaches, the proposed scheme significantly reduces the communication overhead without sacrificing security. Moreover, the sequential test based scheme allows us to further reduce the communication cost, greatly pushing the limit of jamming-resistant broadcast towards optimal.
In the future, we are particularly interested in developing our systems on real wireless communication platforms. It is also highly desirable to evaluate the performance of our approaches through field experiments to obtain more useful results. For example, the analysis on our jamming-resistant broadcast schemes assumes reliable communication if no jammer attacks the network. In other words, during the analysis, we believe that the packet loss is always caused by jammers. We believe that there exists insider jammers if a receiver cannot recover a message. Although this is often true in case of reliable communication, we may draw wrong conclusions in reality since the wireless communication is quite unreliable. The high channel loss may introduce a high decision error rate into our proposed approaches. It is thus important to conducting a thorough analysis on how channel loss rates impact our approaches.
In our schemes, if a suspicious group only has one compromised receiver, this compromise receiver can figure out the group size by looking at how many times the re-grouping process happened. Thus, if the compromised receiver realizes itself the only member in the group, it can stop jamming to prevent itself from being caught. In the future, we are going to make the group size information unpredictable to the receivers by randomizing the re-grouping process. In this way, we can increase the chance of detecting traitors.
